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Brief of Amici Curiae, State v. McPhaul, No. 421PA17 
Abstract 
As the field of forensic science grows, new techniques are developed, and our justice system becomes 
more dependent on the proper application of these techniques, courts play an increasingly crucial role in 
ensuring that only valid, reliable expert testimony is admitted as evidence. As a result, courts have an 
obligation to ensure that unscientific forensic testimony is excluded lest it undermine the integrity of the 
proceedings and, more broadly, the justice system as a whole. Even in the case of forensic techniques 
that are widely recognized as valid, it is incumbent on courts to ensure that those techniques are 
performed reliably before admitting the resulting conclusions as evidence against a defendant in a 
criminal case. As such, we write to emphasize the correctness of the Court of Appeals ruling concerning 
the inadmissibility of the latent fingerprint evidence, as applied in this case, which correctly enforced this 
crucial principle. State v. McPhaul, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 924, 808 S.E.2d 294 (2017). Importantly, we do 
not address the issue of the reliability or admissibility of latent fingerprint evidence in general. Indeed, a 
leading scientific body has recently described latent fingerprint analysis as a foundationally valid 
technique, but only when applied in a reliable fashion. For such a technique, it becomes even more critical 
to ensure that the methods underlying such analysis are properly applied. The potential for unreliability 
and error, which can have devastating effects, lies in the improper application of this technique by 
particular analysts and in particular cases. In this case, defendant Juan McPhaul was convicted of, inter 
alia, attempted murder, assault, and conspiracy to commit robbery based, in part, on the testimony of a 
forensic analyst who described evidence from latent fingerprints. However, the analyst could not provide 
even a modicum of an explanation for how the fingerprints were compared, for how long, based on what 
features or criteria, or with any documentation, and could therefore not provide any objective reason to 
support her conclusion. The trial judge pressed the analyst for more details concerning the analysis, but 
none were forthcoming. Despite repeated questioning from counsel and from the trial judge, the analyst 
could not provide a verbal or documentary explanation of: which features of the prints were examined; 
which features matched; what standard was followed or threshold used to determine that matches were 
significant; what steps taken to safeguard against known biases in subjective analysis; what training or 
research supported the analysis; what authority cited for conclusions, including the scientifically 
indefensible assertion that the latent fingerprints in fact came from the defendant, using terminology that 
has been definitively rejected in the field of latent fingerprint analysis for years. As a result, the Court of 
Appeals correctly concluded under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence that reliable methods 
and principles were not applied to the evidence in this particular case. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the field of forensic science grows, new techniques are developed, and 
our justice system becomes more dependent on the proper application of these 
techniques, courts play an increasingly crucial role in ensuring that only valid, 
reliable expert testimony is admitted as evidence.  As a result, courts have an 
obligation to ensure that unscientific forensic testimony is excluded lest it 
undermine the integrity of the proceedings and, more broadly, the justice system as 
a whole.  Even in the case of forensic techniques that are widely recognized as 
valid, it is incumbent on courts to ensure that those techniques are performed 
reliably before admitting the resulting conclusions as evidence against a defendant 
in a criminal case.  As such, we write to emphasize the correctness of the Court of 
Appeals ruling concerning the inadmissibility of the latent fingerprint evidence, as 
applied in this case, which correctly enforced this crucial principle.  State v. 
McPhaul, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 924, 808 S.E.2d 294 (2017).  Importantly, we do 
not address the issue of the reliability or admissibility of latent fingerprint evidence 
in general.  Indeed, a leading scientific body has recently described latent 
fingerprint analysis as a foundationally valid technique, but only when applied in a 
reliable fashion.  For such a technique, it becomes even more critical to ensure that 
the methods underlying such analysis are properly applied.  The potential for 
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unreliability and error, which can have devastating effects, lies in the improper 
application of this technique by particular analysts and in particular cases.   
In this case, defendant Juan McPhaul was convicted of, inter alia, attempted 
murder, assault, and conspiracy to commit robbery based, in part, on the testimony 
of a forensic analyst who described evidence from latent fingerprints.  However, 
the analyst could not provide even a modicum of an explanation for how the 
fingerprints were compared, for how long, based on what features or criteria, or 
with any documentation, and could therefore not provide any objective reason to 
support her conclusion.  The trial judge pressed the analyst for more details 
concerning the analysis, but none were forthcoming.   
Despite repeated questioning from counsel and from the trial judge, the 
analyst could not provide a verbal or documentary explanation of:  which features 
of the prints were examined; which features matched; what standard was followed 
or threshold used to determine that matches were significant; what steps taken to 
safeguard against known biases in subjective analysis; what training or research 
supported the analysis; what authority cited for conclusions, including the 
scientifically indefensible assertion that the latent fingerprints in fact came from 
the defendant, using terminology that has been definitively rejected in the field of 
latent fingerprint analysis for years.  As a result, the Court of Appeals correctly 
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concluded under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence that reliable 
methods and principles were not applied to the evidence in this particular case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. COURTS HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO EXCLUDE UNRELIABLE
EVIDENCE
Throughout the country, people have been wrongfully accused or convicted
of crimes that they did not commit based on the misapplication of forensic science, 
resulting not only in the imprisonment of innocent individuals but allowing the 
guilty to go free, sometimes to commit additional serious crimes.  As the National 
Research Council noted in a 2009 report:  
in some cases, substantive information and testimony 
based on faulty forensic science analyses may have 
contributed to wrongful convictions of innocent people. 
This fact has demonstrated the potential danger of giving 
undue weight to evidence and testimony derived from 
imperfect testing and analysis. Moreover, imprecise or 
exaggerated expert testimony has sometimes contributed 
to the admission of erroneous or misleading evidence. 
Comm. on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Scis. Cmt., Nat’l Research 
Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 4 
(2009) (“NAS Report”).  Even where forensic testimony is based on valid and 
reliable methods, there have been reports of wrongful convictions based on the 
misapplication of those methods.  For instance, there have been multiple wrongful 
convictions based on DNA evidence (traditionally regarded as the gold standard of 
forensic science) where the techniques were not properly applied.  Brandon L. 
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Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful 
Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1, 66 (2009) (collecting cases); see also President’s 
Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Exec. Office of the President, Forensic 
Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison 
Methods 25 (2016) (“PCAST Report”) (DNA testing unreliable where “testing labs 
lacked validated and consistently-applied procedures”). 
The North Carolina courts serve a vital function in excluding unreliable 
forensic testimony from the courtroom.  This role is enshrined in the North 
Carolina Rules of Evidence, which state that expert testimony may only be 
admitted if all of the following apply: “(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient 
facts or data.  (2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods. 
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, 702(a) (“Rule 702”).  Put another way, where 
“there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion 
proffered,” courts need not, and should not, “admit opinion evidence that is 
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”  State v. McGrady, 
368 N.C. 880, 890, 787 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2016) (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 
522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).  This role is of the utmost importance to the integrity of 
North Carolina’s criminal justice system because criminal convictions, where a 
defendant’s life and liberty are on the line, should not be based merely on the say-
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so of a purported expert.  Instead, courts should take care to admit evidence only 
when an expert can demonstrate that her conclusions flowed directly from a valid 
and reliable forensic technique such that the admission of the evidence is able to 
withstand subsequent scrutiny. 
II. THE RELIABILITY OF LATENT FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS
HINGES ON ITS APPLICATION
The body of scientific evidence concerning the reliability of fingerprint
evidence has advanced considerably, even in the past decade.  Thus, the 
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology found that fingerprint 
evidence has foundational validity, but that meaningful error rates exist, which 
vary depending on how well individual examiners conduct their work, the 
objective proficiency of the individual examiner, and the quality of the evidence at 
issue.  See PCAST Report; Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci., Forensic 
Science Assessments: A Quality and Gap Analysis; Latent Fingerprint 
Examination (2017) (“AAAS Report”).  This variance exists because fingerprint 
analysis is a subjective technique: it relies on the judgment and experience of an 
individual examiner.  Simply put, fingerprint evidence is only as good as the 
person who examined the prints.  
The fact that error rates exist in fingerprint analysis is nothing new.  
Proficiency studies in fingerprinting have been conducted since the 1970s.  
Commercial proficiency tests in the mid-1990s attracted widespread attention 
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because of the large number of participants who made errors on the tests.  Brandon 
L. Garrett and Gregory Mitchell, The Proficiency of Experts, 166 U. Penn. L. Rev. 
901 (2018) (describing results of 1990s latent fingerprint proficiency tests).  Those 
tests were not designed to assess error rates in general, but they made clear that 
errors do occur, at a time when latent fingerprint examiners claimed infallibility 
and that the technique had a reported error rate of “zero.”  See Jonathan J. Koehler, 
Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They Are and Why They 
Matter, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1077 (2008); Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: 
Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1043, 1048 (2005); see also, e.g., United States v. Havvard, 
117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).   
Practices began to change in the wake of the high-profile error in the 
Brandon Mayfield case, in which a Portland, Oregon lawyer was falsely accused of 
playing a role in the Madrid terrorist bombing based on erroneous fingerprint 
matches by multiple analysts.  An FBI expert had called it a “100 percent” certain 
match, but, as Spanish authorities subsequently discovered, the expert’s 
conclusions, as well as those of the expert’s concurring colleagues, were all wrong. 
PCAST Report at 28; U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., A 
review of the FBI’s Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case 1-4 (2006).  In 
response to the error, the Department of Justice made a series of recommendations 
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for improved handling of latent fingerprint analysis at the FBI.  Office of the 
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Handling of the 
Brandon Mayfield Case  9-10, 270-71 (2006). 
The National Academy of Sciences issued landmark findings on forensic 
disciplines in a 2009 Committee report.  See NAS Report.  Those findings included 
statements that, while fingerprint comparisons have served as a valuable tool in the 
past, the methods used in the field—the ACE-V method, for Analysis, 
Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification—are “not specific enough to qualify as a 
validated method for this type of analysis.”  Id. at 142.  The report found that 
merely following the steps of that “broadly stated framework” “does not imply that 
one is proceeding in a scientific manner or producing reliable results.”  Id.  It 
highlighted that “sufficient documentation is needed to reconstruct the analysis” in 
which examiners engage.  Id. at 143.  In addition, it asserted that error rates exist, 
and none of the variables upon which fingerprint examiners rely have been 
“characterized, quantified, or compared.”  Id.  at 144.  Absent any statistical data, 
fingerprint examiners are relying on “common sense” or “intuitive knowledge,” 
but not validated information or research.  Id at 144-45. 
The Presidential Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 2016 
report concluded that while “foundationally valid,” latent fingerprint analysis 
should never be presented in court without evidence of its error rates and of the 
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proficiency or reliability of not just the method, but the particular examiner using 
the method.  PCAST Report at 6.  The PCAST Report noted that error rate studies 
have now been conducted on latent fingerprint analysis.  Id. at 9-10.  In particular, 
two black box studies (or studies that independently test experts for errors using 
realistic materials) were conducted that were methodologically sound and found 
nontrivial error rates: the false-positive error rate “could be as high as 1 error in 
306 cases,” based on an FBI study; or a rate of “1 error in 18 cases,” based on a 
study by the Miami-Dade police laboratory.  Id.   
The AAAS Report added that fingerprint examiners should avoid statements 
that contribute to the “misconceptions” shared by members of the public due to 
“decades of overstatement by latent print examiners.”  AAAS Report at 11.  
Specifically, they asserted that terms like “match,” “identification,” 
“individualization,” and other synonyms should not be used by examiners, nor 
should they state any conclusions that “claim or imply” that only a “single person” 
could be the source of a print.  Id.  Instead, latent fingerprint examiners should at 
most state that they observe similarity between a latent print and a known print, 
and that a donor cannot be excluded as the source.  Id. 
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III. THE TESTIMONY AT TRIAL DOES NOT MEET THE 702(A)(2)-(3)
STANDARD
A. The Fingerprint Examiner Testified to Scientifically Indefensible
Conclusions
In this case, the Fayetteville Police Department latent-print examiner 
testified that fingerprints found on certain pieces of evidence—a car, two 
Domino’s pizza boxes, and a Domino’s chicken wing box—belonged to McPhaul. 
Defendant-Appellant’s Brief at 8, McPhaul, 808 S.E.2d 294, 2016 WL 6312099 at 
*8.  Specifically, the examiner stated that “[i]t was the left palm of Juan Foronte 
McPhaul that was found on the back fender portion of the vehicle.”  (T p 608).  
Similarly, the examiner stated that the print on the Domino’s chicken wing box 
was “[t]he right middle finger of Juan Foronte McPhaul,” as were the prints on a 
bent Domino’s pizza box, while it was his “left middle finger” on a non-bent 
Domino’s pizza box.  (T pp 613-615). 
Those unequivocal conclusions were scientifically improper.  They extend 
farther than the guidance from leading forensic organizations—it was an 
unequivocal statement that the defendant left the print in question.  The national 
Scientific Working Group of Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology 
(“SWGFAST”) has issued guidance that a latent fingerprint examiner should state, 
in extremely strong but probabilistic terms, that “[i]ndividualization of an 
impression to one source is the decision that the likelihood the impression was 
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made by another (different) source is so remote that it is considered as a practical 
impossibility.”  Expert Working Grp. on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis, 
Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech. & Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Latent Print Examination 
and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach 72 
(2012).  That language is incredibly strong and scientific groups have pointed out 
real concerns with it, questioning what is meant by “practical impossibility” and 
the potentially misleading nature of the term “individualization,” which might 
convey that one can match a print “to the exclusion of all others” in the population. 
See id.  Most recently, the AAAS Report stated that latent fingerprint examiners 
should not use terms that imply that a single person was the source of a latent 
fingerprint.  AAAS Report at 11.  Further, the International Association for 
Identification (“IAI”), the largest professional body in the world dealing with 
fingerprint identification forcefully stated in 2009 that members should not state 
“conclusions in absolute terms when dealing with population issues.”  Robert 
Garrett, Letter to IAI Membership (Feb 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.clpex.com/legacy/TheDetail/300-399/TheDetail394.htm. 
The expert in the McPhaul case not only failed to use any accepted 
language, but went further, by categorically stating that it was McPhaul’s print in 
an unqualified conclusion that admitted no possibility of error.  This unqualified 
statement was highly scientifically improper.  Nor was any description of the 
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comparison process provided by the expert, nor the error rate, nor any other 
information provided to qualify the conclusion, as counseled by the PCAST 
Report. 
B. The Fingerprint Testimony Presented Against McPhaul Was
Severely Flawed
The testimony of the Fayetteville Police Department latent-print examiner 
presented in this case was wholly subjective and failed to provide any description 
of the process followed, the criteria relied on, the evidence documented, or how 
conclusions were reached.  The examiner apparently verified or reviewed the work 
of a different examiner, but we do not know whether this review was cursory or 
not.  We do not have any reason to believe that it was done “blind;” indeed, the 
contrary was the case and the examiner knew that the first examiner had found a 
“match” when reviewing the work.  (T p 625).  It is particularly important that a 
verification be conducted in a blind fashion for a subjective and experienced-based 
analysis, like latent fingerprint comparison, so that the verifying review is truly 
independent and not simply a rote confirmation of the work that was already done. 
The myriad flaws in the testimony, which did not follow any of the scientific and 
professional recommendations made in the field, include: 
1. Unknown Comparison Process.  The expert was unable to say what
features of the prints were compared, what process was followed (the examiner did 
not even describe the general ACE-V steps to be followed), or the duration of the 
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examination.  (T p 634).  Both counsel and the judge repeatedly asked how the 
comparison was conducted and nothing responsive was provided.  For example, 
the judge asked, “[w]hat did you do to analyze them?” and the examiner 
responded, “I did comparisons—side by side comparisons . . .”  (T p 633).  She 
could not say what points were found on the prints.  (T p 634).  No information 
about that comparison process was provided in writing or verbally at trial.  
We do know that this analyst said that the work involved “side by side” 
comparison.  (T p 633).  That alone is a troubling red flag.  Examining prints side 
by side can lead to circular reasoning and errors, which is why laboratories and 
analysts that follow best practices, document features in the candidate print first 
before conducting further analysis.  Aside from testifying to the use of a troubling 
“side by side” comparison, the analyst did not provide any information or 
documentation about the process that was followed. 
2. Lack of Documentation.  The examiner provided no documentation
of the comparison process.  The PCAST Report found that “examiners must 
complete and document their analysis of a latent fingerprint before looking at any 
known fingerprint, and should separately document any additional data used during 
comparison and evaluation.”  PCAST Report at 135.  We do not know how many 
features were relied upon, whether there were in fact distortions or inconsistencies 
between these prints, or what process was followed during the examination.  
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Moreover, best practices involve documenting the identified features in the latent 
print before turning to the suspect print and examining its features.   
3. Methods of Comparison.  Beyond failing to explain or document the
comparison process. when asked questions about how the process was conducted 
in practice, the expert testified that it involved looking “back and forth,” agreeing 
that she proceeded by “going back and forth until [] satisfied” that the prints were a 
match, and that “[w]hat you’re looking for are those same characteristics and 
sequence of similarities.”  (T pp 604, 624-25).  The judge, recognizing that the 
expert had not “testified as to what she did and how she reached these 
conclusions,” (T p 631), probed further, and was able to elicit only that the expert 
followed “a comparison process” and conducted an “examination.”  (T p 632).  
4. No Objective Criteria for Reaching the Conclusion.  The examiner
explained that a conclusion on latent fingerprint evidence is reached when “I 
believe there’s enough sufficient characteristics and sequence of the similarities.” 
(T p 638).  That statement reflected a purely subjective view of latent fingerprint 
work.  No objective criteria or standard was provided for how one reaches a 
conclusion. The examiner acknowledged there is no “set point similarity” in the 
field, or a set number of points that one must find in latent fingerprints, or “set 
standard” for how much similarity an examiner must find.  (T p 624). 
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5. Unscientific Ultimate Conclusion Testimony.  The expert simply
reiterated that “[m]y conclusions, your Honor, is that the impressions made 
belonged to Mr. McPhaul.”  (T p 632).  That unqualified conclusion was 
unsupported by any scientific research.  Terms like “match,” “reasonable scientific 
certainty,” and “individualize” have all been criticized as scientifically misleading, 
but this expert went much farther to state that the fingerprints in fact came from 
McPhaul.   
Such categorical source conclusions are not and cannot be supported by the 
principles and methods of latent fingerprint analysis.  AAAS Report at 11.  Those 
methods permit an examiner to observe similarities and to conclude that a donor 
cannot be excluded as a source, but they do not permit an examiner to conclude 
that an individual was in fact the definite source.  Id. 
Such a categorical claim is scientifically indefensible and highly prejudicial. 
The PCAST Report noted: “courts should never permit scientifically indefensible 
claims such as: “zero,” “vanishingly small,” “essentially zero,” “negligible,” 
“identification to the exclusion of all other sources” or a chance of error so remote 
as to be a “practical impossibility.””  PCAST Report at 19.  
6. No Error Rate or Proficiency Information.  No error rate or even an
acknowledgement that another person’s prints could have made the marks was 
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presented to the jurors in the case. The PCAST Report highlighted the importance 
of an expert clearly reporting scientifically sound error rates to the factfinders. 
There must also be rigorous proficiency testing of examiners.  A particular 
type of proficiency test is conducted regularly by the leading commercial provider, 
Collaborative Testing Services Inc. (“CTS”) on fingerprint comparisons. However, 
by CTS’s own admission, these tests are not designed to measure error rates, and 
the results cannot be used to provide assurance that examiners’ conclusions are 
accurate.  Collaborative Testing Servs. Inc., Statement on the Use of Proficiency 
Testing Data for Error Rate Determinations 2-3 (Mar. 2010), available at 
http://www.cts-forensics.com/assets/news/ctserrorratestatement.pdf.  No 
information was provided to the jurors concerning the proficiency of the examiner 
who testified. 
7. Cognitive Bias.  The examiner acknowledged that the initial
examination of the prints, conducted by another examiner, was not verified blind, 
and that instead, she knew what the first examiner had already concluded when she 
made her own review.  (T p 625).  Both the lack of a blind verification and the 
non-documented and unstated process used by the analyst create heightened risk 
that cognitive bias leads to errors.  A body of studies have shown that there are real 
risks of error in forensic techniques, including in fingerprint comparisons, when 
examiners are given contextual information, including that about judgments by 
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other experts.  Itiel E. Dror, David Charlton, Ailsa E. Peron, Contextual 
Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 74 
Forensic Sci. Int’l. 156 (2006). 
C. The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied Rule 702 to Find Error
in Admission of the Fingerprint Testimony at Trial
The adoption of Rule 702 to conform to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and 
the holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 
(1993) included an additional requirement that evidence be based on “principles 
and methods” that are “reliably applied” to the facts of a case, and was intended to 
make the gatekeeping task of a judge more rigorous.  Fed. R. Evid. 702(d) 
(requiring that “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 
facts of the case”); Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report of the 
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules (1999).  That requirement, focusing on the 
application of reliable principles and methods, is particularly important for those 
types of expert evidence that rely on the subjective judgment and experience of the 
expert.  This expert could not explain the principles and methods followed in any 
detail, much less defend their reliability.   
For that reason, the Court of Appeals, in this matter, properly focused its 
review on the conclusions that the expert reached: that the crime scene prints were 
“identified as” the same as those taken from the defendant.  McPhaul, 2017 N.C. 
App. LEXIS 924 at *24, 808 S.E.2d 294 at 305 (quoting the expert testimony).  
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The Court highlighted that in 2011, the North Carolina legislature amended Rule 
702 to adopt the “federal standard,” including language requiring that expert 
testimony “applied” principles and methods “reliably” in a case.  Id. at *20-*21, 
303–304.  The full rule states: 
(a) If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion,
or otherwise, if all of the following apply: (1) The
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data. (2) The
testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods. (3) The witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702.  When the expert here testified about how she 
reached conclusions in the case, she could say only that this was done based on 
“[m]y training and experience.”  McPhaul, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 924 at *24, 808 
S.E.2d 294 at 304.  The Court of Appeals concluded that the expert provided no 
“detail in testifying how she arrived at her actual conclusions in this case.”  Id. at 
*25, 305.  As a result, the panel held it was error to admit the testimony, as there 
was no evidence that methods and principles were reliably applied.  Id. (finding 
error to be harmless, however, given other evidence in the case tying the defendant 
to the crime scene).   
As discussed in the previous section, however, there are many additional 
reasons why this testimony was unreliable and wholly scientifically indefensible. 
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The Court of Appeals did not cite to the PCAST Report or discuss studies of error 
rates in latent fingerprinting.  Likewise, there was no discussion of how the 
examiner reached unsupported conclusions and the court failed to discuss the 
possibility of an error and the examiner’s failure to comply with the current 
guidance in the field.  
In addressing the flaws in the testimony in this case, our analysis is limited 
to the application of fingerprint analysis to the facts of the case.  Fingerprint 
testimony has been admitted in federal and state courts for decades, both before 
and after Daubert and the modern Rule 702 were adopted federally and in North 
Carolina.  See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett and Gregory Mitchell, How Jurors 
Evaluate Fingerprint Evidence: The Relative Importance of Match Language, 
Method Information and Error Acknowledgement, 10 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 484 
(2013). But it is precisely because courts have come to accept the validity of such 
testimony that they have often not examined its application in particular cases or 
questioned its reliability when techniques are not properly applied in a particular 
case.  Courts have instead tended to examine only the past history of general 
acceptance.  See Brandon L. Garrett and M. Chris Fabricant, The Myth of the 
Reliability Test, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 101 (2018).  That is why the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals in this case is so critical and should be affirmed to demonstrate 
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the necessary analysis and considerations courts should apply in determining 
admissibility of fingerprint analysis evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Court should affirm the Court of Appeals’ 
decision excluding the improper testimony on latent fingerprints.   
Respectfully submitted the 30th day of July, 2018. 
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